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COMMENTS
PERSONAL LIABILITY OF LANDOWNERS FOR
REAL ESTATE TAXES IN ILLINOIS
The collection of taxes has long been both one of the principal occupa-
tions and problems of governments. In Illinois, this situation has been com-
plicated by the Illinois Constitution and its policy of not allowing the
classification of property for the purposes of taxation.
In regard to taxes on real property, there are two basic ways provided
for the enforcement of payment, a proceeding against the property, called
the in rem method, and an action against the owner himself, called the
in personam method. The in rem method has three principal subdivisions,
viz., the tax sale, resulting in a tax deed to the purchaser when the statute
is complied with.' The merchantability of such a title is open to serious
doubt, because of the attitude of the courts in failing to sustain many such
titles on highly technical grounds, showing an inclination to strictly con-
strue the act. The second in rem method is the so-called equity fore-
closure, a bill brought by the people against the delinquent land resulting
in a sale that is similar to the sale in a mortgage foreclosure. A second
action is then ordinarily brought by the purchaser at the sale, in the nature
of a bill to quiet title, joining the former owners of the land, and result-
ing in a much better title than that under the tax sale method. If the fore-
closure is of the consent type, where the owner consents to the sale of his
land, a quit-claim conveyance from the owner or owners may then be
substituted for the action to quiet title. In the third method in rem the
action is brought under the Scavenger Act,2 permitting a simpler variation
of the equity foreclosure method, when the tax delinquency is for a longer
period of time. The title that is obtained under this method is as good as
that obtained under the equity foreclosure method.3
The personal liability of the owner of land for the taxes assessed against
it was not provided for at first. The first statute on taxation provided for
a tax of one-half of one percent on land, bank stock, and slaves, 4 this
statute being interpreted in an early case to provide only for satisfaction
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 120, §§ 739-752.
2111. Rev. Star. (1953) c. 120, § 716A.
8 The provisions that govern the in rem methods that are above mentioned will
be found in 111. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 120. They are discussed at length in (1952) Ill.
Law Forum 209.
4Ill. L. 1819, p. 313.
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from the property, and not by any in personam proceeding against the
owner of the property.5 This taxing of named objects, rather than a gen-
eral property tax, remained the policy of Illinois until 1839, when a
general property tax was first imposed by this state. From this time to the
present, Illinois has had a general property tax. The taxing clause of the
Constitution of 1848, which would not allow the classification of property
for purposes of taxation, has been carried over in spirit to the present Con-
stitution of 1870, thus burdening the state with this form of tax, despite
several efforts to change it.
This early view of a strictly in rem method of enforcement of tax
claims against real property was changed in the Revenue Act of 1872,6
which is still, in substance, the personal liability provision of Illinois law.7
The act, in regard to real property, provided that there should be personal
liability for both special assessments and for the general taxes against the
land. The provision providing for personal liability for special assessments
was held to be unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case
of City of East St. Louis v. Illinois State Trust Co.8 The personal liability
for real property taxes was thus restricted to the general property tax.
The constitutionality of the personal liability section was never considered
on its merits by the United States Supreme Court.9
In order for the state to obtain a judgment in personam for real prop-
erty taxes, the law requires that there be a forfeiture of the land for the
nonpayment of taxes.10 This means that there must be a notice to the
owner, a judgment for the unpaid taxes, the process required for a sale
complied with, and a lack of buyers at the sale." The county must prove
5 Edwards v. Beaird, 1 Il1. 70 (1823).
6 111. L. 1871-1872, § 230 page 1.
7 The present act is compiled as 111. Rev. Star. (1953) c. 120, § 756, providing:
"The County Board may, at any time, institute suit in a civil action in the name of
the People of the State of Illinois in any court of competent jurisdiction for the
whole amount due for taxes and special assessments on forfeited property; or any
county, city, town, school district or other municipal corporation to which any
such tax or special assessment may be due, may, at any time, institute a civil action
in its own name, before any court of competent jurisdiction, for the amount of
such tax or special assessment due any such corporation on forfeited property, and
prosecute the same to final judgment .
8 372 Ill. 120, 22 N.E. 2d 944 (1939). The provision was considered as violative of
I11. Const. Art. IX, § 9 allowing the legislature to vest municipal corporate authori-
ties with power to make local improvements by special assessment. The court in-
terpreted this provision to forbid the imposition of personal liability for special
assessments by the legislature.
9 In the only case before the United States Supreme Court on the question of
personal liability the Court did not consider the question on its merits because the
federal constitutional question was not presented in the state court. Harding v.
Illinois, 196 U.S. 78 (1904).
10 111. Rev. Star. (1953) c. 120, § 756. 11 Vetter v. People, 3 111. App. 385 (1879).
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that all these steps for forfeiture were taken to lay the foundation for the
in personan action.' 2 As to the notice required, the Illinois Constitution
requires notice to be given owners and interested parties by publication,
informing them of the time the period of redemption shall expire.'8 Per-
sonal notice must be given to occupants of the land in question before the
period of redemption shall expire. The judgment against the property for
the tax is essential to the constitutionality of the proceeding.
14
The action in personam against the land owner is similar to an ordinary
civil action, in that the defendant is entitled to personal service of
process. 15 The suit is a civil action in the nature of debt,16 and an ordinary
personal judgment results from the proceeding against the owner of the
land at the time of the assessment.' 7 There must be an allegation from
which an averment of ownership at the time of forfeiture can be reason-
ably inferred, stating the year for which the tax is levied, and alleging that
the defendant is the owner on the assessment date in that year.'8
As the statute requires the action to be brought in a court of competent
jurisdiction, the authorization of this section of a suit by the county board
will not operate to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of
Chicago, the Municipal Court Act controlling the jurisdiction of that
Court.'9
Although the section of the statute is silent against whom the action is
to be brought, a clear inference is that the action is to be brought against
the person personally liable under the statute to pay the tax for which the
property was forfeited.20
The defenses available and the effect of a judgment that is obtained in
this proceeding further reflect its ordinary character. The invalidity of
the levy is available to the defendant as a defense to the action.21 The lien
of the judgment obtained in this proceeding is not superior to prior liens
on the land, such as a prior mortgage,22 and in this respect the in personam
12 Scott v. People, 2 111. App. 642 (1878).
13 Ill. Const. Art. IX, § 5.
14 Ill. Const. Art. IX, § 4; Biggins v. People, 106 Ill. 270 (1883).
15 Griffin v. Cook County, 369 11. 380, 16 N.E. 2d 906 (1938).
16 People v. St. Louis Merchant's Bridge Co., 282 Ill. 408, 118 N.E. 733 (1918).
17 Greenwood v. Town of LaSalle, 137 Ill. 225, 26 N.E. 1089 (1891); Byrne v.
Town of LaSalle, 123 Ill. 581, 14 N.E. 679 (1888). The time of the assessment is
April 1 of the tax year, the year before the tax is actually paid.
18 Bowman v. People, 114 111. 474, 2 N.E. 484 (1885); Biggins v. People, 96 111. 381
(1880); People v. Winkelman, 95 111. 412 (1880).
19 People v. Dummer, 274 111. 637, 113 N.E. 934 (1916).
20 Biggins v. People, 96 Ill. 381 (1880).
21 Griffin v. Cook County, 369 Ill. 380, 16 N.E. 2d 906 (1938).
22 Kepley v. Jansen, 107 Ill. 79 (1883). The judgment against the defendant in
this case was for taxes on land other than that subject to the mortgage.
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judgment for the taxes differs from the in rein enforcement.23 The statu-
tory requirement 4 that execution be taken out within one year applies to
this judgment, in order to make it a lien on the land of the defendant,
good against a subsequent purchaser of the land.2 5 A claim of a homestead
right is good as a prior claim against a judgment in personam for taxes,
even if the taxes are due on the same land out of which the homestead
claim is made.2 6 The in personam enforcement of a real estate tax is a con-
current remedy with the more usual enforcement against the land; only a
satisfaction of the debt in another proceeding will bar the personal claim.2 7
Although the county board is empowered by the statute to commence
the action,28 the board need not expressly authorize each action against
the delinquent taxpayer.2 9 In the absence of fraud, the overvaluation of the
property by the assessor is not a defense to the action in personam against
the landowner. 30 But when the land on which the taxes sought to be col-
lected in a personal action has been adjudged exempt, in a prior proceed-
ing, from taxes, this is a bar to the personal action.31 Also, an individual
taxing unit within the county may institute an action for the amount of
the tax that is due it, without any action by the county board, but only
the county board may bring an action for the entire amount due.3 2 While
a school district may bring an in personam action for the amount of the
tax due it, the trustees of schools of a township may not maintain such an
action, as they are not included in the statute, as the statute relating to
personal liability for real estate taxes3 3 provides the exclusive method of
enforcing such personal liability.34 The school district itself could, how-
ever, bring the action in its own name.35 For the same reason that the
23The lien of taxes on land takes precedence over prior encumbrances, Jader
v. Costello, 405 Il. 181, 89 N.E. 2d 814 (1950); Murch v. Epley, 385 111. 138, 52
N.E. 2d 125 (1944).
24111. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 77, § 1: "... When execution is not issued on a judg-
ment within one year from the time the same becomes a lien, it shall thereafter
cease to be a lien. . ."
25 Smith v. Toman, 368 I11. 414, 14 N.E. 2d 478 (1938). The judgment that was
sought to be claimed as a lien on the land was for the nonpayment of personal
property taxes in this case, but the effect would be the same if it were for taxes on
real property.
26 Douthett v. Winter, 108 Ill. 330 (1884).
27People v. Davis, 112 111. 272 (1884). 28111. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 120, § 756.
29 People v. Kimmel, 323 111. 261, 154 N.E. 97 (1926).
-30 Ibid.; People v. Hibernian Banking Association, 245 Ill. 522, 92 N.E. 305 (1910).
31 Elmwood Cemetery Company v. People, 204 Ill. 468, 68 N.E. 500 (1903). The
land was held exempt in this case as a graveyard.
32 Ward v. City of Alton, 23 111. App. 475 (1887).
331l1. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 120, § 756.
34 School District No. 88 v. Kooper, 380 Ill. 68, 43 N.E. 2d 542 (1942).
35 School District No. 88 v. Holland, 384 Ill. 277, 51 N.E. 2d 266 (1943).
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trustees of the township schools could not bring the action, the board of
education of a school district was not allowed to maintain a similar action
for the amount of taxes on forfeited land due to it.86
When a personal judgment has been obtained against the owner of the
land, it is then too late for the owner to start, or have started, any other
proceeding against the land itself, so as to defeat the personal liability of
said owner on the personal judgment that has been rendered against him.
As was held in the case of Byrne v. Town of La Salle,8 7 after a judgment
has been rendered against the property owner individually, he cannot then
commence any proceeding to relieve himself of liability by having the
tax satisfied out of the land. Thus the use of the in personam judgment for
taxes has the advantage of not allowing the property owner to reduce the
amount of the tax he actually pays by the device of a tax foreclosure later.
The formality required of the in personam action is not as extreme as
that required to enforce the claim against the land. Even irregularities
that would be admittedly fatal to a tax deed to the land have been held
not to be fatal to a judgment in personam for the amount of the taxes. 8
Part of the more liberal attitude may be attributed to the fact that the
defendant does receive personal notice of the action, and thus the oppor-
tunity, more surely, to defend the action for the taxes.
As the cases for the enforcement of the liability for real property taxes
against the owner of the land by an in personam proceeding indicate,
recent action along this line has not been common. The increased number
of personal judgments obtained against owners of land on which taxes
are delinquent has advantages which would seem to recommend its in-
creased use. One of the principal advantages to its use would be in giving
the state a method of making unpaid taxes on one parcel of land owned
by a person, a lien on other land the person may own, by having the judg-
ment against him made a lien on the other land, thus hampering the owner
in dealing with the other, and possibly more desirable land that he owns
until the taxes and penalties on the delinquent parcel are paid. Spreading
the lien to more property would have the effect of forcing a quicker set-
tlement of delinquent taxes on land, and should result in more revenue to
the taxing bodies.
The increased use of the personal judgment against tax delinquent
36 Board of Education of District 88 of Cook County v. Home Real Estate In-
provement Corporation, 378 111. 298, 38 N.E. 2d 17 (1941). The court reasons that
as this is a statutory proceeding, the right to sue is vested in "school districts or
other municipal corporations," not in boards of education.
87 123 I11. 581, 14 N.E. 679 (1888). The proceeding was attempted to be started
under Smith Hurd Stat. c. 120, S 189, now codified as I11. Rev. Star. (1953) c. 120,
S 727.
8 Greenwood v. Town of La Salle, 137 111. 225, 26 N.E. 1089 (1891); Sanderson
v. Town of La Salle, 117 111. 171, 7 N.E. 114 (1886).
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landowners would also discourage the practice in some cases of allowing
the taxes to run on land that is not likely to be sold for lack of buyers at
the tax sale, in the hope of a settlement at a later time, through a consent
foreclosure proceeding, for a smaller amount than the taxes due. If the
lien were placed on the owner, as well as on the land, the loss through this
process to the state might be lessened. The threat of a personal action for
the payment of the unpaid real estate taxes should increase the number
that are paid, especially on vacant land in undeveloped areas, the principal
class of land on which it has been found profitable in some instances to
allow the taxes to accrue.
While the use of the personal method of the enforcement of a tax claim
will hardly end all nonpayment of taxes, it may possibly act as some
deterrent to the most flagrant violators of the tax law, those who look at
it as a speculation, hoping to, in effect, discount their property tax by
allowing it to accrue, and by means of a friendly foreclosure proceeding,
aided by the highly technical process to obtain a merchantable title to
land without the consent of the former owner, reduce the amount of tax
they pay. The in personam method of enforcement may be of some aid
in acting as a deterrent to this.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE TO SHOW NON-
DONATIVE INTENT IN JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
The problem of admissibility of parol evidence has been discussed by
many courts in the past with seemingly basic disagreements in regard to
the special situation where the evidence is submitted to dispute the exist-
ence of a joint bank account.
The factual situation prevalent in most of these instances has one de-
positor, called a donor, supplying the funds and executing a joint bank
account with another, called a donee-survivor. Both parties sign an agree-
ment appearing on a signature card at the time of opening the account
whereby they agree with the bank that either party or the survivor is en-
titled to draw funds from the account with the account being the joint
property of the two depositors, and finally, the sole property of the sur-
vivor upon the death of one of the joint owners. There is no dispute when
the donor-depositor is the survivor, since the funds were originally his,
but a dispute often arises between the donee-survivor and the executor of
the donor's estate upon the death of the donor-depositor as to whether
the intent was to open up a joint account with survivorship rights, or
whether the intent was for some other reason, such as convenience.
The disagreement among the states, therefore, takes the form of whether
parol evidence may be allowed to show this other intention or whether
the agreement on the signature card is conclusive evidence of the inten-
